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Abstract
In this paper preparation sequencing situations are introduced. This new type of one-
machine sequencing situations assumes that before a job can start, some preparation
depending on its predecessor is required. Preparation sequencing situations are ﬁrst an-
alyzed from an operations research perspective: optimality conditions are provided and
an algorithm is provided to obtain an optimal order. Secondly, we analyze the allocation
problem of the minimal joint cost from a game theoretic perspective. A corresponding
preparation sequencing game is deﬁned and the focus is on the core and nucleolus of such
games.
keywords: preparation times, sequencing situations, cooperative game theory, core,
nucleolus
JEL classiﬁcation code: C71
1 Introduction
Sequencing theory deals with a variety of problems sharing several characteristics: a number
of jobs have to be processed on one or more machines, in such a way that a cost criterion is
minimized. From one sequencing problem to another the way these characteristics are deﬁned
can diﬀer and additional constraints can be added: the machines can be parallel or serial,
there can be conditions on the order in which the jobs should be processed and diﬀerent cost
criteria can be used. Applications of the theory of sequencing situations are numerous and
diverse: from manufacturing and maintenance to scheduling patients in an operating room.
The starting point of the game theoretic analysis of sequencing situations is the paper by
Curiel, Pederzoli, and Tijs (1989). In their one-machine model, only one job can be processed
at a time. The processing time is deterministic for every job, and every job has a certain
constant cost per time unit it spends in the system. A job is in the system from the moment
the machine starts processing the ﬁrst job until the job itself is processed by the machine. An
order that minimizes total cost, processes the jobs in a decreasing order with respect to their
urgency (cost per time unit divided by the length of the job, cf. Smith (1956)). A procedure
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1is introduced that, given an initial order, uses neighbor switches to obtain the optimal order
and constructs a stable cost allocation in the process.
Since Curiel, Pederzoli, and Tijs (1989) several related classes of sequencing problems are
discussed, including ready times, due dates, multiple machines and numerous cost criteria (see
e.g., Curiel et al. (2002), Borm et al. (2002), Calleja et al. (2002) and Slikker (2005)). The
model we will discuss here deals with the phenomenon that the state in which the machine is
left behind by a player’s predecessor inﬂuences the amount of time the player needs before he
can start on his actual job. One can think of cleaning up a machine, adjusting a machine to
the new jobs or something simple as erasing the blackboard before one can start the lecture.
This is captured in our model of preparation sequencing situations: a one-machine sequencing
situation, where the time a job spends in the system depends on its predecessor. Moreover,
contrary to the basic model, it is assumed that a job just enters the system as soon as the
previous job is ﬁnished. However, after every job some preparation is required. The amount
of time this takes depends on the type of job that was processed before. This way, the
cost incurred by a job depends on the duration of the preparation, its own processing time
and the cost per time unit. As the costs incurred during the processing of the job itself is
constant across all possible orders of jobs, we will not incorporate these costs into our analysis.
Verdaasdonk (2007) initiated the study on this subject. In the current paper, we will focus
on those preparation sequencing situations where there are only two diﬀerent values for the
preparation time and two diﬀerent values for the costs per time unit.
The topic will be treated from two perspectives. The ﬁrst part concerns the operations
research perspective. For each preparation sequencing situation we will characterize optimal
orders in which joint costs are minimized, and provide an algorithm to obtain an optimal
order. The second part, concerning the game theoretic perspective, involves the allocation of
the minimal joint costs. We deﬁne an objective and consistent way to determine cost sav-
ings for each coalition of jobs. For the resulting cooperative game a ﬁrst focus point is the
core. We show that under mild conditions a stable allocation exists. Furthermore, we provide
explicit expressions for the core of a large class of preparation sequencing situations. We for-
mulate conditions such that the core of the preparation sequencing game is a singleton. Also,
similarities between a special class of assignment games called B¨ ohm-Bawerk horse market
games (see e.g., B¨ ohm-Bawerk (1923) and N´ u˜ nez and Rafels (2005)), and certain preparation
sequencing games are pointed out. It is well known that the core of a B¨ ohm-Bawerk horse
market game is a line segment (Shapley and Shubik (1971)), where one extreme point is
‘buyer’-optimal and the other extreme point is ‘seller’-optimal. Under mild conditions, the
core of a preparation sequencing situation is a line segment, where we can identify two subsets
of the player set, acting as the ‘buyers’ and the ‘sellers’. A second focus point is the nucleolus
(Schmeidler (1969), see Peleg and Sudh¨ olter (2003) for a survey on the nucleolus). As the
nucleolus is a core-selector, for those preparation sequencing games where the core is a single-
ton the nucleolus coincides with the core. If the core is a line segment, we provide an explicit
expression of the nucleolus in terms of the underlying preparation sequencing situation. As
the general expression for the nucleolus heavily depends on the exact parameters, we provide
a more basic and less volatile allocation rule called the large instance based allocation rule
that coincides with the nucleolus for large classes of preparation sequencing games and is also
contained in the core for every preparation sequencing game.
Related sequencing problems are discussed by Gupta (1988) and Van der Veen et al.
(1998). In Gupta (1988) the mean ﬂow time is minimized in sequencing situations with
switching times between jobs depending on the class of both jobs. Not only is the objective
2function diﬀerent from ours, but Gupta (1988) also assumes that the switching time between
pair of jobs within the same class is zero. The change-over model by Van der Veen et al.
(1998) on the other hand deﬁnes the switching time yet in a diﬀerent way, and minimizes the
makespan rather than total costs.
The paper is organized as follows: in the subsequent section, we formally introduce the
preparation sequencing model. Also, we provide optimality conditions regarding the pro-
cessing order, and give an algorithm to ﬁnd an optimal order. Section 3 contains the game
theoretic analysis and focusses on characterizing the core and the nucleolus for preparation
sequencing games.
2 Preparation sequencing situations
A preparation sequencing situation is deﬁned by a tuple Ψ = (N,α,p,p0). Here, N denotes
the nonempty ﬁnite player set. It is assumed that every player owns exactly one job. As
there is a one-to-one correspondence between players and jobs, we will use the words player
and job interchangeably throughout the paper. The vector α ∈ RN
+ is such that for player
i ∈ N, the costs of spending t time units in the system is given by αit. The preparation times
are denoted by the vector p ∈ RN
+, where for i ∈ N, pi is the preparation time needed after
the job of player i is processed and before the machine can process another job. Note that
pi denotes the preparation time needed after job i ∈ N, and not the processing time of job i.
The time needed before the machine can process the ﬁrst job is denoted by p0.
A processing order on the jobs is described by a bijection σ : {1,..,|N|} → N, where σ(k)
denotes the job at position k in the queue. The set of all orders on N is denoted by Π(N).
For notational convenience, we set σ(0) = 0 and therefore pσ(0) = p0 for all σ ∈ Π(N).
In preparation sequencing situations, it is assumed that a player enters the system at the
moment the machine starts to be prepared for his job and leaves the system as soon as his
job is ﬁnished. This situation is shown in Figure 1. This diﬀers from standard sequencing
problems as depicted in Figure 2, where there are no preparation times and a player enters
the system already as the ﬁrst job in the order starts processing and leaves after his own job
is ﬁnished.
Machine Prep Job 1 Prep Job 2 Prep Job 3
Time in system job 3
Figure 1: Time in system for preparation sequencing
Machine job 1 job 2 job 3
Time in system job 3
Figure 2: Time in system for standard sequencing
The time a job spends in the system consists of a preparation time depending on the job that
is processed before him and his own processing time. The costs arising from this last part is
constant over all orders. Hence, we just focus on the costs arising from preparation. So, for












Table 1: Partition of the player set
For a coalition S ∈ 2N, we set γS(σ) =
 
i∈S γi(σ). We call an order σ∗ ∈ Π(N) optimal for
N if γN(σ∗) = min{γN(σ) | σ ∈ Π(N)}.
In this paper we will restrict ourselves to the analysis of preparation sequencing situations
with two diﬀerent values for the preparation times and two diﬀerent values for the cost per
time unit. We denote by Prep2,2 the class of all preparation sequencing situations satisfying
this restriction. So, for every (N,α,p,p0) ∈ Prep2,2, there exist αH,αL ∈ R+, αH > αL such
that for all i ∈ N it holds that either αi = αH or αi = αL. With respect to the preparation
times, we assume there exist ph,pl ∈ R+, ph > pl, such that for all i ∈ N ∪ {0} it holds that
either pi = ph or pi = pl. We partition the set of players according to their characteristics as




l . Note that the superscript refers to the
cost per time unit, and the subscript refers to the preparation time. Also, throughout the
paper uppercase H and L will refer to cost per time unit and lowercase h and l to preparation
time. We denote NH = NH
h ∪ NH
l , and deﬁne NL, Nh and Nl in a similar way. For a subset
S ∈ 2N we use a similar notation: SH
h = S ∩ NH
h , SH = S ∩ NH, etc.
Example 2.1. Consider the preparation sequencing problem Ψ = (N,α,p,p0), where N =
{1,2,3}, α = (α1,α2,α3) = (4,1,1), p = (p1,p2,p3) = (3,3,1) and p0 = 3. It is readily
checked that NH
h = {1}, NH
l = ∅, NL
h = {2} and NL
l = {3}. The order σ ∈ Π(N) such
that σ(1) = 3, σ(2) = 2 and σ(3) = 1 gives γ1(σ) = p2α1 = 12, γ2(σ) = p3α2 = 1, and
γ3(σ) = p0α3 = 3, so γN(σ) = 16. However, the order σ′ ∈ Π(N) such that σ(1) = 2,
σ(2) = 3 and σ(3) = 1 gives γN(σ′) = 10.








Figure 3: The orders σ and σ′ for the preparation sequencing situation of Example 2.1.
Naturally, an interesting question is how we can identify whether an order is optimal or not.
Also, if we can ﬁnd suﬃcient conditions for this, could we use these conditions to construct
an optimal order? As it turns out, we can indeed ﬁnd such conditions and use these to obtain
an algorithm that constructs an optimal order for every preparation sequencing situation in
Prep2,2.
First we focus on the suﬃcient conditions. For this, we introduce the following additional
notation. Given a preparation sequencing situation (N,α,p,p0) ∈ Prep2,2 and an order
σ ∈ Π(N), deﬁne the following classes of neighboring pairs:
MhH(σ) = {(i,j) ∈ (N ∪ {0}) × N | pi = ph, αj = αH, σ−1(i) = σ−1(j) − 1},
4MlL(σ) = {(i,j) ∈ (N ∪ {0}) × N | pi = pl, αj = αL, σ−1(i) = σ−1(j) − 1},
MhL(σ) = {(i,j) ∈ (N ∪ {0}) × N | pi = ph, αj = αL, σ−1(i) = σ−1(j) − 1},
and
MlH(σ) = {(i,j) ∈ (N ∪ {0}) × N | pi = pl, αj = αH, σ−1(i) = σ−1(j) − 1}.
Note that the ﬁrst superscript indicates the preparation time and the second superscript
indicates the cost level. For every σ ∈ Π(N), we have the following equalities:
|MhH(σ)| + |MlH(σ)| = |NH|, (1)
and
|MlL(σ)| + |MhL(σ)| = |NL|. (2)
If p0 = ph, we have for every order σ ∈ Π(N) that
|MlH(σ)| + |MlL(σ)| = |Nl| −
1[pσ(|N|)=pl], (3)
and




1[pσ(|N|)=ph], p0 = ph and the preparation time of the last player in the
order does not incur costs for a player in N. If p0 = pl, we have
|MlH(σ)| + |MlL(σ)| = |Nl| +
1[pσ(|N|)=ph], (5)
and
|MhH(σ)| + |MhL(σ)| = |Nh| −
1[pσ(|N|)=ph], (6)
for every order σ ∈ Π(N). Again, note that
1[pσ(|N|)=ph] = 1 −
1[pσ(|N|)=pl]. The following
theorem states the suﬃcient conditions for an order to be optimal.
Theorem 2.2. Let (N,α,p,p0) ∈ Prep2,2 and let σ ∈ Π(N). If pσ(|N|) = maxi∈N pi and
either |MhH(σ)| = 0 or |MlL(σ)| = 0, then σ is optimal.
Proof. Assume p0 = ph and ﬁrst consider the case where maxi∈N pi = pl. This implies that
|NH
h | = |NL




plαi + (p0 − pl)ασ(1) =
 
i∈N
plαi + (ph − pl)ασ(1).
Take an order σ′ ∈ Π(N) such that |MhH(σ′)| = 0. As p0 = ph, we obtain that ασ′(1) = αL
and therefore σ′(1) ∈ NL
l . Hence, γN(σ′) =
 
i∈N plαi+(ph−pl)αL ≤ γN(σ) for all σ ∈ Π(N),
so σ′ is optimal.
Now take an order σ′′ ∈ Π(N) such that |MlL(σ′′)| = 0 and |MhH(σ′′)| > 0. Then
either |NL
l | = 0, which means that N = NH
l and every order is optimal, or |NL
l | = 1 with
σ′(1) ∈ NL
l . In the last case γN(σ′′) =
 
i∈N plαi + (p0 − pl)αL ≤ γN(σ) for all σ ∈ Π(N),
and σ′′ is optimal.
5Now consider the case where maxi∈N pi = ph. Take an arbitrary σ ∈ Π(N). Take B,D ∈ N
such that B = |MhH(σ)| and D = |MlL(σ)|. Note that by Equation (2) and (4) we have
B − D = |MhH(σ)| − |MlL(σ)| = |NH
h | − |NL
l | +
1[pσ(|N|)=pl].
By (3) and (4) it holds that
γN(σ) = |MhH(σ)|phαH + |MlH(σ)|plαH + |MhL(σ)|phαL + |MlL(σ)|plαL
= BphαH + (|Nl| −
1[pσ(|N|)=pl] − D)plαH
+ (|Nh| +
1[pσ(|N|)=pl] − B)phαL + DplαL
≥ (B − min{B,D})phαH + (|Nl| −
1[pσ(|N|)=pl] − D + min{B,D})plαH
+ (|Nh| +
1[pσ(|N|)=pl] − B + min{B,D})phαL + (D − min{B,D})plαL
= max{0,|NH












h | − |NL
l |}phαH + min{|Nl|,|NH|}plαH
+ min{|NL|,|Nh|}phαL + max{|NL
l | − |NH
h |,0}plαL
where the inequalities follow from the observation that (ph − pl)(αH − αL) > 0. The ﬁrst
inequality holds with equality if either B = 0 or D = 0, and the second inequality holds with
equality if pσ(|N|) = ph. This shows that an order σ ∈ Π(N) with pσ(|N|) = ph and either
|MhH(σ)| = 0 or |MlL(σ)| = 0 is optimal.
The case where p0 = pl can be proven analogously, using Equation (5) and (6) instead of
Equation (3) and (4).
The optimality conditions in Theorem 2.2 consist of two parts: the ﬁrst condition states that
it is optimal to place a player with highest preparation time possible at the last position.
The second condition means that it is optimal to place players with low costs behind players
with high preparation time and players with high costs behind players with low preparation
time. These conditions are used in the following algorithm. The ﬁrst condition is explicitly
taken care of in step 2, the second condition is dealt with in step 3. Step 4 deals with these
optimality conditions more implicitly, which is demonstrated in Example 2.3.
Algorithm 1
Input: a preparation sequencing situation (N,α,p,p0) ∈ Prep2,2.
Output: an order ˜ σ ∈ Π(N).


















s ∩ NL if p˜ σ(s−1) = ph and C2
s ∩ NL  = ∅,
C2
s ∩ NH if p˜ σ(s−1) = pl and C2








s ∩ Nl if C3
s ∩ Nl  = ∅,
C3
s else.
Step 5. Choose a job i ∈ C4
s and deﬁne ˜ σ(s) = i.
Step 6. If s = |N|, stop.
If s < |N|, set s = s + 1 and, subsequently, set C1
s = C1
s−1\{˜ σ(s − 1)}. Next, return
to step 2.
The notation ˜ σ is used for an order provided by the algorithm. The algorithm gener-
ates this order by ﬁlling up all positions in the order from front to back. For every po-





s ∈ 2N are the sets of candidate players for the sth position in this
order.
Example 2.3. Consider the preparation sequencing situation Ψ = (N,α,p,p0), where we
have α = (2,2,1,1), p = (3,1,3,1) and p0 = 3. We have NH
h = {1}, NH
l = {2}, NL
h = {3},
and NL
l = {4}. As |Nh| = 2, we have C2
1 = C1
1 = N (see Table 2). In step 3 we obtain
C3
1 = {3,4} as p0 = ph. Step 4 further narrows down the set of candidate players for the
ﬁrst position, as C4
1 = {4}. Therefore, we obtain ˜ σ(1) = 4. Now that player 4 is placed, we
have C2
2 = C1
2 = {1,2,3}. In step 3 of iteration 2, we obtain C3
2 = {1,2} and in step 4 we
obtain C4
2 = {2} so ˜ σ(2) = 2. In the third iteration, C2
3 = C1
3 = {1,3} and C4
3 = C3
3 = {1} so
˜ σ(3) = 1 and ˜ σ(4) = 3.
s 1 2 3 4
C1
s N {1,2,3} {1,3} {3}
C2
s N {1,2,3} {1,3} {3}
C3
s {3,4} {1,2} {1} {3}
C4
s {4} {2} {1} {3}
˜ σ(s) 4 2 1 3
Table 2: Sets of candidate players in Example 2.3
It is easily seen that a player with high preparation time is placed last. Furthermore, players
with high costs are placed behind players with low preparation time and the other way around
(see Figure 4). We obtain γN(˜ σ) = 10 which is indeed optimal. Also, note the importance of
step 4 of the algorithm: if we would place an arbitrary player in C3
2 at position 2, we could
have ended up with the order σ′ such that σ′(1) = 4, σ′(2) = 1, σ′(3) = 2, σ′(4) = 3, with
γN(σ′) = 12.
73 1 , 1 2 , 1 2 , 3 1 , 3
4 2 1 3
p0
α4,p4 α2,p2 α1,p1 α3,p3
Figure 4: Order ˜ σ provided by Algorithm 1 in Example 2.3
Now we are ready to prove that Algorithm 1 provides an optimal order, for every preparation
sequencing situation (N,α,p,p0) ∈ Prep2,2.
Theorem 2.4. Let Ψ = (N,α,p,p0) ∈ Prep2,2. Then Algorithm 1 provides an optimal order
for N.
Proof. Let ˜ σ ∈ Π(N) be an order provided by Algorithm 1. In Step 2 of the algorithm, it
is made sure that there is always a player with the highest available preparation time left to
place at the last position. Hence, p˜ σ(|N|) = ph, unless NH
h ∪ NL
h = ∅ which implies that there
is in fact only one value for pi and p˜ σ(|N|) = pl = maxi∈N pi.
We will prove that either |MhH(˜ σ)| = 0 or |MlL(˜ σ)| = 0, since this would via Theorem
2.2 imply that ˜ σ is optimal.
Assume on the contrary that both |MhH(˜ σ)| > 0 and |MlL(˜ σ)| > 0. Then there exist
s,r ∈ {0,...,|N| − 1} such that (˜ σ(s), ˜ σ(s + 1)) ∈ MhH(˜ σ) and (˜ σ(r), ˜ σ(r + 1)) ∈ MlL(˜ σ).
Assume r < s. According to the algorithm, job ˜ σ(r + 1) is only placed behind job ˜ σ(r)
if there is no job j with αj = αH left that is not yet placed, or there is only one job j with
αj = αH left, but this job has to be reserved for the last spot because it is the only remaining
job with high preparation. In the ﬁrst case, we have a contradiction, since job ˜ σ(s + 1) is
not yet placed. The second case also results in a contradiction, since both p˜ σ(s) = ph and
p˜ σ(|N|) = ph.
Now assume s < r. According to the algorithm, job ˜ σ(s + 1) is only placed behind job
˜ σ(s) if there is no job j with αj = αL left that is not yet placed, or there is only one job j with
αj = αL left, but this job has to be reserved for the last spot because it is the only remaining
job with high preparation. In the ﬁrst case, we have a contradiction, since job ˜ σ(r+1) is not
yet placed.
The second case can only hold if r + 1 = |N|. For all jobs i ∈ {˜ σ(s + 1),..., ˜ σ(r)} it
then must hold that pi = pl, otherwise job ˜ σ(r + 1) would have been placed at position
s + 1. Furthermore, αi = αH otherwise job i would have been placed at position s + 1
as this would avoid the combination of ph and αH. So, we obtain that i ∈ NH
l for all
i ∈ {˜ σ(s + 1),..., ˜ σ(r)}. Since the algorithm ﬁrst places the jobs in NH
l before placing the
jobs in NH
h , and ˜ σ(|N|)  ∈ NH
h , we obtain that NH
h = ∅. Furthermore, if there existed a job
i ∈ NL
l then the algorithm would place every job in NH
l directly behind this job. But since
˜ σ(s)  ∈ NL
l this implies that NL
l = ∅. Hence, the second case only allows players in NH
l and
NL
h , so NH
h ∪ NL
l = ∅. The solution provided by the algorithm for this situation (ﬁrst all
players in NL
h but one, then all players in NH
l and ﬁnally the last player in NL
h ) is clearly
optimal.
The proof of Theorem 2.4 implies the following.
Remark 2.5. If NH
h ∪ NL
l  = ∅, then every order provided by the algorithm satisﬁes the
suﬃcient conditions of Theorem 2.2.
83 Preparation sequencing games
In the previous section we addressed the problem of ﬁnding an optimal order for preparation
sequencing situations. An additional question is how the total costs of such an optimal order
should be allocated among the players. To answer this question, we will use the framework
of transferable utility games. Let us ﬁrst recall some basic concepts within cooperative game
theory used in the later analysis.
A transferable utility game (N,v) is deﬁned by a ﬁnite player set N and a function v on the
set 2N of all subsets of N assigning to each coalition S ∈ 2N a value v(S) ∈ R such that
v(∅) = 0. The imputation set I(v) of a game (N,v) is given by all individually rational and
eﬃcient allocations, so
I(v) = {x ∈ RN |
 
i∈N
xi = v(N),xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N}.
For a game (N,v), the core C(v) is deﬁned as the set of those imputations, for which no
coalition has an incentive to split oﬀ:






xi ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ 2N}.
A game (N,v) is called balanced if its core is nonempty. A game (N,v) is called convex if
v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T) for all i ∈ N and S ⊂ T ⊂ N\{i}. Every convex game
has a nonempty core. If for i ∈ N and j ∈ N it holds that v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) for all
S ∈ 2N\{i,j}, then player i and j are called symmetric.
We deﬁne the excess of coalition S ∈ 2N with respect to allocation x ∈ I(v) by E(S,x) =
v(S) −
 
i∈S xi. The excess measures the dissatisfaction of coalition S with respect to al-
location x. Let ω(x) ∈ R2|N|
be the vector of excesses of x ∈ I(v), arranged in weakly
decreasing order. For a game (N,v) such that I(v)  = ∅, the nucleolus η(v) (Schmeidler
(1969)) is the unique imputation x ∈ I(v) such that ω(x) is lexicographically smaller than
ω(y) for all y ∈ I(v). So, the nucleolus is the individual rational and eﬃcient allocation that
minimizes the highest dissatisfactions in a hierarchical manner. For every game (N,v) such
that C(v)  = ∅, we have η(v) ∈ C(v). Furthermore, if player i ∈ N and player j ∈ N are
symmetric in the game (N,v) then ηi(v) = ηj(v).
We will limit the game theoretic analysis of preparation sequencing situations to those in-
stances of Prep2,2 where p0 = ph, denoted by Prep
2,2
h . We assume that by cooperating, every
coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} can form any order σ ∈ Π(S). Thus we employ a pessimistic view, in
the sense that the preparation time for the ﬁrst player in the order σ equals p0 = ph. This
setup allows us to measure the value of every coalition consistently over all coalitions, and
independent of the players outside the coalition. This approach cannot be used for the case
where p0 = pl as this would result in an optimistic assessment of the cost of a coalition.
Let Ψ = (N,α,p,p0) be a preparation sequencing situation. We will deﬁne the costs for
coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} as the costs of an optimal order in the preparation sequencing problem
(S,α′,p′,p′
0), where α′ ∈ RS and p′ ∈ RS∪{0} are such that α′
i = αi for all i ∈ S, and p′
i = pi
for all i ∈ S ∪{0}. Given a preparation sequencing situation Ψ = (N,α,p,p0) and a coalition
S ∈ 2N\{∅}, we denote by ˜ σS an optimal order of the situation (S,α′,p′,p′
0). Hence, formally,




γi(˜ σ{i}) − γS(˜ σS),
for all S ∈ 2N\{∅}. Clearly, vΨ({i}) = 0 for every i ∈ N.
Example 3.1. Reconsider the preparation sequencing situation of Example 2.3, where α =
(2,2,1,1), p = (3,1,3,1) and p0 = 3. It is easily seen that γ1(˜ σ{1}) = γ2(˜ σ{2}) = 6 and
γ3(˜ σ{3}) = γ4(˜ σ{4}) = 3. Take S = {1,2,4}. The optimal order ˜ σS is such that ˜ σS(1) = 4,
˜ σS(2) = 2, and ˜ σS(3) = 1, which results in total costs γS(˜ σS) = 7. Hence, we have vΨ(S) =
(6 + 6 + 3) − 7 = 8. Table 3 displays the value of every coalition. Note that (N,vΨ) is not
convex, since vΨ({3,4}) − vΨ({4}) = 2 > 0 = vΨ(N) − vΨ({1,2,4}).
S 1 2 3 4 12 13 14 23 24 34 123 124 134 234 N
v(S) 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 2 2 2 4 8 4 6 8
Table 3: The game (N,vΨ) of Example 3.1
For Ψ = (N,α,p,p0) ∈ Prep
2,2
h we can explicitly express the value of each coalition in terms
of the number of players in the diﬀerent player classes in the preparation sequencing situation.





                
                
(|SH
l | + |SL
l |)(ph − pl)αH if SH
h  = ∅ and |SH
h | ≥ |SL
l |;
|SH
h |(ph − pl)(αH − αL) + |SH
l |(ph − pl)αH if SH
h  = ∅ and |SH
h | < |SL
l |;
+ |SL
l |(ph − pl)αL
|SH
l |(ph − pl)αH + |SL
l |(ph − pl)αL if SH
h = ∅,SL
l  = ∅ and SL
h  = ∅;
|SH
l |(ph − pl)αH + (|SL
l | − 1)(ph − pl)αL if SH
h = ∅,SL
l  = ∅ and SL
h = ∅;
(|SH
l | − 1)(ph − pl)αH + (ph − pl)αL if SH
h = ∅,SL
l = ∅,SH
l  = ∅
and SL
h  = ∅;
(|SH
l | − 1)(ph − pl)αH if SH
h = ∅,SL




l = ∅ and SH
l = ∅
for all S ∈ 2N\{∅}.
Proof. We will only prove the ﬁrst case, the expressions for the other cases follow from a similar
reasoning. Take S ∈ 2N such that SH
h  = ∅ and |SH
h | ≥ |SL
l |. First of all,
 





l |)phαL. Since SH
h  = ∅, we know that for every optimal order
˜ σS it holds that p˜ σS(|S|) = ph. Furthermore, since SH
h  = ∅ we have by Remark 2.5 that either
|MhH(˜ σS)| = 0 or |MlL(˜ σS)| = 0. By equations (1) − (4), it must hold that |MlL(˜ σS)| = 0,
since |MhH(˜ σS)| = 0 would imply that |MlL(˜ σS)| < 0. So, we have
γS(˜ σS) = |MhH(˜ σS)|phαH + |MlH(˜ σS)|plαH + |MhL(˜ σS)|phαL + |MlL(˜ σS)|plαL,
= (|SH
h | − |SL
l |)phαH + (|SH
l | + |SL
l |)plαH + (|SL
h| + |SL
l |)phαL,




γi(˜ σ{i}) − γS(˜ σS),
= (|SH
h | + |SH




h | − |SL
l |)phαH + (|SH
l | + |SL




l | + |SH
l |)(ph − pl)αH.
All marginal contributions can be readily determined from Lemma 3.2.
Corollary 3.3. Let Ψ = (N,α,p,p0) ∈ Prep
2,2
h , i ∈ N and S ∈ 2N\{i}. If i ∈ NH
h ,
vΨ(S ∪ {i}) − vΨ(S) =

      
      
(ph − pl)αH if S  = ∅,SH
h = ∅ and SL
h = ∅;
(ph − pl)(αH − αL) if SH
h  = ∅ and |SH




l  = ∅ and SL




l  = ∅ and SL
h  = ∅;
0 otherwise.
If i ∈ NL
l ,
vΨ(S ∪ {i}) − vΨ(S) =

    
    
0 if S = ∅;
(ph − pl)αH if SH
h  = ∅ and |SH




l = ∅ and SH
l  = ∅;
(ph − pl)αL otherwise.
If i ∈ NH
l ,




0 if S = ∅;
(ph − pl)αL if SH
h = ∅,SL
l = ∅,SH
l = ∅ and SL
h  = ∅;
(ph − pl)αH otherwise.
Finally, if i ∈ NL
h ,
vΨ(S ∪ {i}) − vΨ(S) =
 
(ph − pl)αL if S  = ∅,SH
h = ∅ and SL
h = ∅;
0 otherwise.
The following example illustrates both Lemma 3.2 and Corollary 3.3.
Example 3.4. Consider the preparation sequencing situation Ψ = (N,α,p,p0) ∈ Prep
2,2
h such
that N = {1,2,3,4,5,6}, α = (5,5,5,2,2,2), p = (3,3,1,3,1,1) and p0 = 3. This means that
NH
h = {1,2}, NH
l = {3}, NL
h = {4} and NL
l = {5,6}. Consider the coalition S = {1,3,6}.
The stand-alone costs for these players are γ1(˜ σ{1}) = γ3(˜ σ{3}) = 15 and γ6(˜ σ{6}) = 6. Using
11Algorithm 1, we obtain ˜ σS(1) = 6, ˜ σS(2) = 3 and ˜ σS(3) = 2 for the optimal order ˜ σS for
coalition S. Hence, γS(˜ σS) = 16 and vΨ(S) =
 
i∈S γi(˜ σ{i}) − γS(˜ σS) = 20. This is in line
with Lemma 3.2, as (|SH
l |+|SL
l |)(phαH −plαH) = 2(15−5) = 20. By Corollary 3.3, we have
v({2,3,6}) − v({3,6}) = (ph − pl)αH = 10 which is easily veriﬁed, as v({3,6}) = 10. On the
other hand, the marginal contribution of player 2 when he joins coalition {1,3,6} equals zero,
as v({1,2,3,6}) = v({1,3,6}).
We will use the expressions from Lemma 3.2 to show that every preparation sequencing game
has a nonempty core. To this end, we deﬁne the large instance based allocation rule θ on the
class of preparation sequencing situations Prep
2,2
h .
Deﬁnition 3.5. Let Ψ = (N,α,p,p0) ∈ Prep
2,2
h . Then, for all i ∈ N,
θi(Ψ) = (ph − pi)αi +

               
               
(αH−αL)(ph−pl)
2 if i ∈ NH
h ∪ NL
l and |NH
h | = |NL
l |;
(αH − αL)(ph − pl) if i ∈ NH
h and |NH
h | < |NL
l |,
or if i ∈ NL
l and |NH




l |(ph − pl)αL if i ∈ NL
l and |Nh| = 0;
− 1
|NH
l |(αH − αL)(ph − pl) if i ∈ NH
l ,|NL
h | > 0 and
|NH
h | = |NL
l | = 0;
− 1
|NH
l |(ph − pl)αH if i ∈ NH
l and N = NH
l ;
0 otherwise.
The common part of the expression for θ(Ψ), (ph − pi)αi, gives an estimation of the cost
savings that can be attributed to player i. This estimation is based on the marginal costs
of player i entering in a ﬁctive, ‘large’ coalition. The part phαi are the stand-alone costs of
player i. Now assume there is an order σ ∈ Π(N) where pσ(k) = pi for some k. If player i is
placed in between player σ(k) and player σ(k+1), then the marginal costs equal piαi. Hence,
we estimate the cost savings by (ph − pi)αi.
The second part serves as a correction to this estimation: a player in NH
h and a player in
NL
l together are responsible for more cost savings than we already allocated to them. These
additional cost savings go to the minority, the players in NH
h if |NH
h | < |NL
l | and the players
in NL
l if |NL
l | < |NH
h |, and is shared equally if |NH
h | = |NL
l |. The other corrections are due
to ‘small’ instances: for example, if there are no players in both NH
h and NL
l , then the cost
savings attributed to players in NH
l is overestimated, and is corrected.
Example 3.6. Reconsider the preparation sequencing situation Ψ of Example 3.4. We have
|NH
h | = |NL
l | > 0, so θ(Ψ) = (3,3,10,0,7,7).
For every preparation sequencing situation Ψ ∈ Prep
2,2
h , the large instance based allocation
rule provides a core element for the corresponding game (N,vΨ).
Theorem 3.7. Let Ψ = (N,α,p,p0) ∈ Prep
2,2
h . Then θ(Ψ) ∈ C(vΨ).
Proof. We consider four diﬀerent cases, and use Lemma 3.2 and Deﬁnition 3.5 in each of these
cases.
12(i) Assume |NH
h | = 0, |NL
l | = 0 and |NL
h | > 0. For S ∈ 2N\{∅} we have









  (ph − pl)(αH − αL)
 
− (|SH








  (ph − pl)(αH − αL)
 
− (|SH






)(ph − pl)(αH − αL)
≥ 0,
with equality if S = N, and therefore θ(Ψ) ∈ C(vΨ).
(ii) Assume |NH
h | + |NL
l | > 0 and |Nh| > 0. For S ∈ 2N\{∅} we have
θS(Ψ) − vΨ(S) ≥ |SH
l |(ph − pl)αH + |SL
l |(ph − pl)αL
+ min{|SH
h |,|SL
l |}(ph − pl)(αH − αL)
− |SH
l |(ph − pl)αH + |SL
l |(ph − pl)αL
− min{|SH
h |,|SL
l |}(ph − pl)(αH − αL)
≥ 0,
again with equality if S = N, and therefore θ(Ψ) ∈ C(vΨ).
(iii) Assume |Nh| = 0 and |NL
l | > 0. For S ∈ 2N\{∅} we have
θS(Ψ) − vΨ(S) ≥ |SH
l |(ph − pl)αH + |SL




  (ph − pl)αL)
− |SH
l |(ph − pl)αH − (|SL








with equality if S = N, and therefore θ(Ψ) ∈ C(vΨ).
(iv) Finally, assume |NH
h | = |NL
l | = |NL
h | = 0. For S ∈ 2N\{∅} we have
θS(Ψ) − vΨ(S) = |SH




  (ph − pl)αH)
− (|SH








with equality if S = N, and therefore θ(Ψ) ∈ C(vΨ).
13For every preparation sequencing situation Ψ = (N,α,p,p0) ∈ Prep
2,2
h such that |NH
h | =
|NL
l | > 0, the core is the convex hull of two vectors. We will show this in Theorem 3.8.
This structure of the core is similar to the one for a speciﬁc type of assignment games, called
B¨ ohm-Bawerk horse market games (B¨ ohm-Bawerk 1923), in the sense that the core consist
of a line segment, where one extreme point is ‘buyer’-optimal and the other extreme point is
‘seller’-optimal. In our setting, the players in NH
h act as the buyers and players in NL
l act
as the sellers. Translated into the terminology of horse market games, every player in NH
h
is interested to buy the right on low preparation, and every player in NL
l is interested to
sell the right on low preparation. By interacting on the market, every pair of a buyer and a
seller creates a proﬁt that can be shared in an arbitrary, nonnegative way. This proﬁt equals
(ph − pl)(αH − αL).
For a preparation sequencing situation Ψ = (N,α,p,p0) ∈ Prep
2,2
h and j ∈ N, deﬁne
θj(Ψ) = (ph − pj)αj +
 
(ph − pl)(αH − αL) if j ∈ NH
h ;
0 else,
θj(Ψ) = (ph − pj)αj +
 
(ph − pl)(αH − αL) if j ∈ NL
l ;
0 else.





Note that θ(Ψ) corresponds to the ‘buyer’-optimal allocation, and θ(Ψ) to the ‘seller’-optimal
allocation.
Theorem 3.8. Let Ψ = (N,α,p,p0) ∈ Prep
2,2
h be such that |NH
h | = |NL
l | > 0. Then
C(vΨ) = Conv{θ(Ψ),θ(Ψ)}.
Proof. First we establish that Conv{θ(Ψ),θ(Ψ)} ⊆ C(vΨ), by showing that θ(Ψ) ∈ C(vΨ)
and θ(Ψ) ∈ C(vΨ).
Let S ∈ 2N\{∅}. Then we have that
 
i∈S
θi(Ψ) − vΨ(S) =
 
i∈S
(ph − pi)αi + |SH
h |(ph − pl)(αH − αL) − vΨ(S)
≥ |SH
l |(ph − pl)αH + |SL
l |(ph − pl)αL + |SH




l |   (ph − pl)αH + |SL












(ph − pl)(αH − αL)
≥ 0.
Note that the ﬁrst inequality follows from Lemma 3.2, and that for S = N the two inequalities
hold with equality. Hence, θ(Ψ) ∈ C(vΨ). A similar reasoning shows that θ(Ψ) ∈ C(vΨ).
Now we show that C(vΨ) ⊆ Conv{θ(Ψ),θ(Ψ)}. It suﬃces to show that for every x ∈
C(vΨ) it holds that:
(i) xi ≥ 0 for every i ∈ N.
14(ii) xi = 0 for every i ∈ NL
h .
(iii) xi = (ph − pl)αH for every i ∈ NH
l .
(iv) xi + xj = (ph − pl)αH for every i ∈ NH
h and j ∈ NL
l and, therefore,
xi = xk for all i,k ∈ NH
h , and xj = xr for all j,r ∈ NL
l .
(v) (ph − pl)αL ≤ xi ≤ (ph − pl)αH for every i ∈ NL
l .
Note that (iv) and (v) together imply 0 ≤ xi ≤ (ph −pl)(αH −αL) for every i ∈ NH
h . We will
prove (i) - (v) point by point. Take x ∈ C(vΨ).
(i) As xi ≥ v({i}) and v({i}) = 0 for every i ∈ N, we have xi ≥ 0 for every i ∈ N.
(ii) As vΨ(N\NL
h ) = vΨ(N), we obtain xi = 0 for all i ∈ NL
h .














h ∪ {i}) + vΨ(N\NH
h )
= (|NL
l | + 1)(ph − pl)αH + |NH
l |(ph − pl)αH




xj + (ph − pl)αH.
Hence, xi ≥ (ph −pl)αH. By Corollary 3.3, we have vΨ(N)−vΨ(N\{i}) = (ph −pl)αH
and therefore xi = (ph − pl)αH.
(iv) Take i ∈ NH
h and j ∈ NL
l . As vΨ({i,j}) = (ph − pl)αH = vΨ(N) − vΨ(N\{i,j}) we
have xi + xj = (ph − pl)αH.
(v) By (iv), we have that xi = xj for all i,j ∈ NL
l . Moreover, since
vΨ(NL
h ∪ NL
l ) + vΨ(NH
h ∪ NH
l ∪ NL
l ) = |NL
l |(ph − pl)αL + vΨ(N),
it follows that xi ≥ (ph − pl)αL for every i ∈ NL
l . Furthermore, since
v(N) − v(N\NL
l ) = |NL
l |(ph − pl)αH,
it follows that xi ≤ (ph − pl)αH.
Not only for preparation sequencing situations with |NH
h | = |NL
l | > 0 we can ﬁnd an easy
expression for the structure of the core of the corresponding game. If the player set contains
at least one player of every type and |NH
h |  = |NL
l |, the large instance based allocation rule
turns out to be the only core element.
15Theorem 3.9. Let Ψ = (N,α,p,p0) ∈ Prep
2,2






h |  = |NL
l |. Then θ(Ψ) is the only core element of (N,vΨ) and, conse-
quently, θ(Ψ) = η(vΨ).
Proof. For every x ∈ C(vΨ) and i ∈ N it holds that xi ≤ vΨ(N) − vΨ(N\{i}). By eﬃciency
of θ, it suﬃces to show that θi(Ψ) = vΨ(N) − vΨ(N\{i}) for every i ∈ N.
First consider the case |NH
h | > |NL
l |. By Corollary 3.3 and Deﬁnition 3.5 we obtain that
vΨ(N) − vΨ(N\{i}) =

    
    
0 if i ∈ NH
h ;
(ph − pl)αH if i ∈ NL
l ;
(ph − pl)αH if i ∈ NH
l ;
0 if i ∈ NL
h ;
= θi(Ψ).
Now consider the case |NL
l | > |NH
h |. Then, by Corollary 3.3 and Deﬁnition 3.5,
vΨ(N) − vΨ(N\{i}) =

    
    
(ph − pl)(αH − αL) if i ∈ NH
h ;
(ph − pl)αL if i ∈ NL
l ;
(ph − pl)αH if i ∈ NH
l ;
0 if i ∈ NL
h ;
= θi(Ψ).
The coincidence between the large instance based allocation rule θ and the nucleolus can
be extended to preparation sequencing situations as considered in Theorem 3.8 with one
further restriction.
Theorem 3.10. Let Ψ = (N,α,p,p0) ∈ Prep
2,2
h be a preparation sequencing situation such
that |NH
h | = |NL
l | > 1. Then θ(Ψ) = η(vΨ).
Proof. We show that θ(Ψ) = η(vΨ) by showing that the vector of excesses of θ(Ψ) is lexico-
graphically smaller than the vector of excesses of any other core element. By Theorem 3.8,
C(vΨ) = Conv{θ(Ψ),θ(Ψ)}. So, take c ∈ [0,1] and deﬁne xc = cθ(Ψ) + (1 − c)θ(Ψ). By
Lemma 3.2, the excesses are
E(S,xc) =

           
           
−c(|SH
h | − |SL
l |)A if SH
h  = ∅ and |SH
h | ≥ |SL
l |;
−(1 − c)(|SL
l | − |SH
h |)A if SH
h  = ∅ and |SH
h | < |SL
l |;
−(1 − c)|SL
l |A if SH
h = ∅,SL
l  = ∅ and SL
h  = ∅;
−(1 − c)|SL
l |A − (ph − pl)αL if SH
h = ∅,SL





l  = ∅ and SL
h  = ∅;
−(ph − pl)αH if SH
h = ∅,SL
l = ∅,SH




l = ∅ and SH
l = ∅;
where A = (ph − pl)(αH − αL) > 0.
16It is readily checked that the highest excess equals 0. This excess occurs, independent of
the value of c, for every coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} such that either |SH
h | = |SL
l | > 0 or S = SL
h.
For c = 0 or c = 1, there are additional coalitions with excess equal to zero whereas for
c ∈ (0,1) all other coalitions have a negative excess. Hence, both x0  = η(vΨ) and x1  = η(vΨ).
Since −(ph −pl)αH < 0 and −(ph −pl)αL < 0, for c ∈ (0,1) the second highest excess equals
either −cA or −(1 − c)A, or a multiple of these values. Hence, the second highest excess is
minimized for c = 1
2, implying that η(v) = x
1
2 = θ(Ψ).
In general, the large instance based allocation rule does not coincide with the nucleolus. In
fact, the expression for the nucleolus becomes quite involved as it depends not only on the
number of players of every type as in the deﬁnition of θ(N,α,p,p0), but on the speciﬁc values
for ph,pl,αH, and αL as well.
Example 3.11. Consider a preparation sequencing situation Ψ = (N,α,p,p0) such that
|NH
h | = 0, |NL
l | = 0, |NH
l | > 1 and |NL
h | = 1. By Lemma 3.2 we have
vΨ(N) = (|NH
l | − 1)(ph − pl)αH + (ph − pl)αL.
By the observation that all players in NH








l |(vΨ(N) − µ) if j ∈ NH
l ;
µ if i ∈ NL
h ,
for some µ ∈ R. Let j be the unique element of NL
h . The excesses are
E(S,xµ) =

     
     






(ph − pl)(αH − αL) + µ
 
− (ph − pl)αH if SH







(ph − pl)(αH − αL) + µ
 
if SH
l  = ∅ and j ∈ S;
−µ if SH
l = ∅ and j ∈ S;
Using a similar approach as in the proof of Theorem 3.10, we obtain that the relevant excesses
are given by −µ, −(ph − pl)αL + µ and − 1
|NH
l |((ph − pl)(αH − αL) + µ). For |N| ≤ 2αH
αL ,
the maximum of these excesses is minimized by taking µ = 1






l |+1|(ph − pl)αH minimizes the maximum of these excesses. Hence, we have
ηi(vΨ) =

     
     
1
2(ph − pl)αL if i = j and |N| ≤ 2αH
αL ;
(ph − pl)(αL − αH
|NH
l |+1) if i ∈ NH
l and |N| > 2αH
αL ;
(ph − pl)(αH |NH
l |−1
|NH
l | + αL
2|NH





l |+1|(ph − pl)αH if i ∈ NL
h and |N| > 2αH
αL .
It is readily checked that θ(Ψ) = x0, i.e. it distributes vΨ(N), irrespective of the speciﬁc values
of the parameters αH and αL, equally over the players in NH
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